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The issue revolving around corporate governance and financial performance has always 
been an essential and critical element for banking sector in Nigeria. This study 
investigates the effect of risk management committee characteristics (risk management 
committee size and risk management committee independence) and board financial 
expertise on the financial performance of quoted banks in Nigeria. The research used 
secondary data obtained from the annual report of banks listed in the Nigerian Stock 
exchange for the year 2013-2016 with 56 firm-year observations and based on panel 
data approach. Furthermore, the regression estimates are based on random effect and 
Fixed effect models. The result indicates that risk management committee size and risk 
management committee independence have insignificant relationship with financial 
performance of ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q. This means an increase or decrease in risk 
management committee size has no effect on financial performance. Board financial 
expertise exhibit a negative relationship with ROA and ROE. This revealed that the 
more the financial expert in an organization the less is financial performance. This is 
because of the risk that will be avoided. Besides, providing suggestion for future 
research work, this study provides several recommendations for regulators and the 
Nigerian banking industry. The findings of the study would give invaluable insight to 
the stock market, government, auditing and accounting regulators and auditing and 
accounting professional bodies, as to what extent codes of corporate governance 
regulators and laws are implemented by the banks and other financial services. 
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Isu yang berputar di sekitar tadbir urus korporat dan prestasi kewangan sentiasa menjadi 
unsur penting dan kritikal bagi sektor perbankan di Nigeria. Kajian ini menyiasat kesan 
ciri-ciri jawatankuasa pengurusan risiko (saiz jawatankuasa pengurusan risiko, 
kebebasan jawatankuasa pengurusan risiko) dan kepakaran kewangan ke atas prestasi 
kewangan bank-bank yang tersenarai di Nigeria. Kajian ini menggunakan data sekunder 
yang diperoleh daripada laporan tahunan empat belas (14) bank yang disenaraikan di 
bursa saham Nigeria untuk tahun 2013-2016 dengan 56 pemerhatian firma tahun dan 
berdasarkan pendekatan data panel. Selain itu, anggaran regresi adalah berdasarkan 
kesan rawak dan kesan tetap. Hasilnya menunjukkan bahawa saiz jawatankuasa 
pengurusan risiko dan kebebasan jawatankuasa pengurusan risiko mempunyai 
hubungan yang tidak signifikan dengan prestasi kewangan ROA, ROE dan Tobin's Q. 
Ini bermakna peningkatan atau penurunan saiz jawatankuasa pengurusan risiko tidak 
memberi kesan kepada prestasi kewangan. Kepakaran kewangan ahli Lembaga 
pengarah menunjukkan hubungan negatif dengan ROA dan ROE. Ini mendedahkan 
bahawa semakin ramai pakar kewangan dalam organisasi  semakin kurang prestasi 
kewangan bank. Ini kerana risiko yang akan dielakkan. Selain menyediakan cadangan 
untuk kerja-kerja penyelidikan masa depan, kajian ini menyediakan beberapa cadangan 
untuk pengawal selia dan industri perbankan Nigeria. Penemuan kajian ini  juga akan 
memberi maklumat kepada  pasaran saham, kerajaan,  badan-badan  pengauditan dan 
perakaunan tentang  sejauh mana kod tadbir urus korporat,  dan undang-undang  yang 
dilaksanakan oleh bank-bank dan lain-lain perkhidmatan kewangan 
 
Kata kunci: saiz jawatankuasa pengurusan risiko, kebebasan jawatankuasa pengurusan 






















In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious and Most Merciful. All my praises and gratitude 
to Allah, the Merciful, the creator and custodian of the Universe for His kindness, 
blessing and guidance which has provided me the strength to face all the tribulations 
and trials in completing this project. No amount of gratitude will suffice my Dad and 
my Mum who guide, natured me and brought me up as a Muslim and who laid down 
the solid foundation for my education dream turned into reality, thank you and God 
Bless. I am also grateful to all other members of my family and other well-wishers 
whose prayers and support has been of tremendous help. 
 
I would like to extend my appreciation to my supervisor, in person to Dr.Hanita Binti 
Kadir for her encouragement, and willingness to support me throughout this study. I 
would also like to express my sincere gratitude for her enthusiasm and guidance. The 
completion of this study has been possible with her guidance. I owe a great deal of 
gratitude to Universiti Utara Malaysia for giving me the chance to pursue my higher 
education and to accomplish my purpose of getting this degree, as well as to whole 
Malaysia (government and friendly people). 
 
I must make special mention of my brothers and sisters, Abdurrahman Dahir Ahmed, 
Amina Dahir Ahmed, Abdelfattah Dahir Ahmed, Sumaya Dahir and Asma Dahir for 





I also wish to extent my appreciation to my academic mentors, friends and my 
professional colleagues who gave me moral support and advice, Ahmad Haruna 
Abubakar, Abdullahi Mohamed Mohamud, Abdulrahman Ibrahim Ali, Abdullahi Yusuf 
Abdi, Abdirzak Warsame and, Maslah Abdullahi Gabre,  and all those who have assisted 
me in this study directly or indirectly, whose names are ,too numerous to be mentioned 
here, may Allah guide and protect them in all their endeavours, Ameen. 
 
Finally, I wish to dedicate this study to my late father (Dahir Ahmed Eigale) and my 
mother (Maryam Hassan) as they are always being my strongest supporters. I am 
indebted to all my family members for their love and appreciation throughout my study. 
 
 















TABLE OF CONTENT 
 
 
PERMISSION TO USE ............................................................................................................ ii 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................. iii 
ABSTRAK................................................................................................................................ iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ........................................................................................................ v 
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................... xi 
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................ xii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................ xiii 
CHAPTER ONE ....................................................................................................................... 1 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1Background to the Study .................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Problem Statement ............................................................................................................ 5 
1.3 Research Questions ........................................................................................................... 9 
1.4 Research Objectives .......................................................................................................... 9 
1.5 Significance of the Study ................................................................................................. 10 
1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study ................................................................................. 11 
1.7 Organization of the Thesis ............................................................................................... 11 
CHAPTER TWO .................................................................................................................... 12 
LITERATURE REVIEW ....................................................................................................... 12 
2.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 12 
2.2 Concept of corporate governance ..................................................................................... 12 
2.3 The Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance .................................................................. 14 
2.4 Corporate Governance Regulation in Nigeria ................................................................... 15 
2.5 Concept of bank financial performance ............................................................................ 16 
2.6 Underpinning Theories .................................................................................................... 18 
2.6.1 Agency Theory ......................................................................................................... 18 
2.6.2 Resource dependency theory ..................................................................................... 19 
2.7. Corporate Governance Structure ..................................................................................... 21 
2.7.1 RMC Size ................................................................................................................. 21 
2.7.2 RMC Independence .................................................................................................. 22 
2.7.3 Board Financial Expertise ......................................................................................... 23 
viii 
 
2.8 Empirical Review of Risk management committee characteristics and board financial 
expertise on firm performance. .............................................................................................. 25 
2.9 Gaps in the literature ....................................................................................................... 27 
2.10 Summary of the chapter ................................................................................................. 28 
CHAPTER THREE ................................................................................................................ 29 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................... 29 
3.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 29 
3.2 Theoretical Framework.................................................................................................... 29 
3.3 Hypothesis Development ................................................................................................. 30 
3.3.1 RMC Size and Financial Performance ....................................................................... 30 
3.3.2 RMC Independence and Financial Performance ........................................................ 32 
3.3.3 Board Financial Expertise and Financial Performance ............................................... 33 
3.4. Research Design ............................................................................................................. 34 
3.5 Measurement of the Variables ......................................................................................... 35 
3.5.1 Dependent Variable .................................................................................................. 35 
3.5.2 Independent Variables .............................................................................................. 37 
3.5.2.1 RMC Size .............................................................................................................. 37 
3.5.2.2 RMC Independence ............................................................................................... 37 
3.5.2.3 Board Financial Expertise ...................................................................................... 38 
3.5.3 Control Variables...................................................................................................... 38 
3.6 Population of the Study ................................................................................................... 42 
3.6.1 Sample Size and Sampling Technique ....................................................................... 42 
3.7. Sources of Data and Methods of Data Collection ............................................................ 43 
3.8. Method of Data Analysis ................................................................................................ 44 
3.8.1 Model Specification and Multiple Regressions .......................................................... 44 
3.9 Data Analysis .................................................................................................................. 45 
3.9.1 Descriptive Analysis ................................................................................................. 45 
3.9.2 Diagnostic Test Panel Data Analysis ......................................................................... 45 
3.9.2.1 Normality Test ....................................................................................................... 46 
3.9.2.2 Heteroscedasticity Test .......................................................................................... 46 
3.9.2.3 Autocorrelation Test .............................................................................................. 46 
3.9.2.4 Multicollinearity Test............................................................................................. 47 
3.9.3 Correlations .............................................................................................................. 48 
ix 
 
3.9.4 Panel Data Analysis .................................................................................................. 48 
3.9.4.1 Fixed Effect Model ................................................................................................ 49 
3.9.4.2 Random Effect Model ............................................................................................ 49 
3.9.4.3 Hausman Test ........................................................................................................ 49 
3.9.4.4 Breusch and Pegan Langrangian Multiplier Test .................................................... 49 
3.9.5 Multiple Linear Regression Analysis ........................................................................ 50 
3.10 Summary ....................................................................................................................... 50 
CHAPTER FOUR ................................................................................................................... 51 
RESULT AND DISCUSION .................................................................................................. 51 
4.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 51 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics ....................................................................................................... 51 
4.3 Multicollinearity .............................................................................................................. 53 
4.4 Correlation Analysis ........................................................................................................ 54 
4.5 Multiple Regressions Analysis ......................................................................................... 58 
4.5.1 Assumption of Multiple Regression .......................................................................... 58 
4.5.1.1 Normality Test ....................................................................................................... 58 
4.6. Homoscedasticity ........................................................................................................... 60 
4.7. The Evaluation of the Models ......................................................................................... 62 
4.7.1. Fixed effect Versus Random effect (Estimation Techniques and Diagnostic Tests) ... 62 
4.7.2. The Evaluation of Individual Models ....................................................................... 65 
4.7.2.1 Model I (ROA as Dependent Variable) .................................................................. 65 
4.7.2.2 Model II (ROE as Dependent Variable).................................................................. 67 
4.7.2.3 Model III (Tobin’s Q as Dependent Variable) ........................................................ 68 
4.8 Fitness of the Theories ..................................................................................................... 69 
4.9. Summary of the Chapter ................................................................................................. 70 
CHAPTERFIVE ..................................................................................................................... 71 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................... 71 
5.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 71 
5.2 Summary of the Study and Discussion of Hypotheses ...................................................... 71 
5.2.1 Discussion of First Model (Results Based on ROA) .................................................. 71 
5.2.2 Discussion of Second Model (Results Based on ROE) .............................................. 74 
5.2.3 Discussion of Third Model (Results Based on Tobin’s Q) ......................................... 76 
5.3 Implication of the Study .................................................................................................. 77 
x 
 
5.4 Limitations ...................................................................................................................... 77 
5.5 Suggestions for Future Research ...................................................................................... 78 



























LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 3.1. Summary of the Operationalization of Research Variables.........………...41 
Table 3.2. Listed Banks in Nigeria …………………………………………….…. ...43 
Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics of continues variables……………………………...52 
Table 4.2. VIF and Tolerance Statistics ………………………………………......... .54 
Table 4.3. Pearson correlations……… …………………………………………........ 57 
Table 4.4. Skewness and Kurtosis……………………………………………… ……59 
Table 4.5 Heteroskedasticity Test (Model I) ………………………………….….......61 
Table 4.6 Heteroskedasticity Test (Model II) ………………………………….……. 61 
Table 4.7 Heteroskedasticity Test (Model III) ………………………………….……. 61 
Table 4.8 Summary of regression results …. ………………………………….……. 64 
Table 4.9 Coefficient of Regression (ROA) ………………………………….….…. 66 
Table 4.10 Coefficient of Regression (ROE) ………………………………….……. 68 
Table 4.11 Coefficient of Regression (TQ) …………………………………….……. 69 










LIST OF FIGURES 
 




























LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
Abbreviation   Description of Abbreviation 
RMCSIZE   Risk Management Committee Size 
RMCINDE   Risk Management Committee Independence 
BFE                    Board Financial Expertise  
CBN    Central Bank of Nigeria  
BANKAGE    Bank Age  
FIRMSIZE   Firm Size 
BOD                                        Board of Directors 
SEC    Security and Exchange Commission  
ROA    Return on Asset  
ROE                                         Return on Equity 
TQ                                           Tobin’s Q 
VIF    Variance Inflation Factor  
OECD                            Organization for Economic Corporate and Development 
CAC    Corporate Affairs Commission  
CAMA              Company Allied Matters Act 
ISEM                                       International Stock Exchange Markets 
BOFIA                                     Banks and other Financial Institutions Act 
ISA                                     Investment and Securities Act 
EPS                                          Earning Per Share 
FEM                                        Fixed Effect Model 
REM                                        Random Effect Model 




      CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the Study 
Banks are important for economic progress because they offer various financial 
services. Profitability in Nigerian banking sector is key for economic development, 
through which fund will be mobilize, allocation of credits to various segments of the 
economy, payment and clearance systems, and the implementation of financial strategy 
(Enobakhare,2010). Their intermediation function is said to be an incentive for 
economic development. The financial strength in any country depend on the well-
organized and active performance of the banking sector over time. The level to which a 
bank give acclaim to the public for productive activities hurry the speed of a nation’s 
sustainability and economic growth (Kolapo, Ayeni, & Oke, 2012). During the 
execution of such obligations, banks face numerous risks that must be carefully 
managed to ensure existence and success. (Oldfield & Santomero, 1995). 
 
According to Khan and Ahmed (2001), the existence and success of a financial 
institution is highly dependent on the efficiency of risk management. Due to their 
involvement in the corporate governance mediation process, risk management and 
financial performance are key concepts to ensure financial stability in general. Poor risk 
management and weak corporate governance systems in the banking sector could cause 





Subsequently, weaknesses in corporate governance, risk management were main 
contributing factors to recent global financial crises (Bello, 2016). 
 
By virtue of the relationship that exists between banks and their stakeholders, the 
stakeholders have a responsibility to ensure that the bank is managed well. Jensen 
(1993) hypothesize that stakeholders of banks influence how banks manage risks. 
because researchers have realised stakeholders such as governmental bodies, political 
groups, trade associations, trade unions, communities, associated corporations, 
prospective employees and the general public, the actions of a corporate have impact on 
the external environment Enobakhare, (2010). shareholders to help advance corporate 
efficiency. 
 
A statement organized by the United States Senate’s permanent subcommittee studying 
the failure of Enron “based on an exhaustive review of evidence found, the Enron 
corporation’s board of directors failed to monitor, the board chose to ignore problems, 
other times it knowingly allowed Enron to engage in high risk practices, the board also 
approved an unprecedented arrangement, in so doing, the board breached its duties to 
safeguard Enron shareholders”, (Rosen, 2003). 
 
Having different technical financial knowledge is indeed imperative for directors to 
enable them to understand complicated financial statement. Directors sitting on the 





operations presented to them, they could unconsciously vote for resolutions that do not 
necessarily increase shareholders’ wealth (Dionne & Triki 2005).  
 
In Nigeria, corporate governance is been given attention by all the parts of the economy. 
In 2003 a team was set up for public companies regarding corporate governance known 
as peterside committee by the Security and Exchange Committee (SEC). the 
commission set about its task by creating the corporate governance practices already 
dominant in Nigeria. Also, the committee is responsible to recognize weaknesses in the 
corporate governance practices in Nigeria with reverence to public companies and to 
make approvals on the necessary changes to current practices. in August 2003, in 
response of the serious roles played by CG in the collapse or success of Banks in Nigeria 
a subcommittee was established for banks (Ogbechie, 2006). 
 
Banks failures in Nigeria were highly attributed to bad risk management practices 
occuring in large quantum of non-performing credits including insider related credit. 
According to Central Bank of Nigerian (CBN) code of corporate governance 2006 each 
bank should put in place a risk management framework including a risk management 
unit that should be headed by a senior executive, in line with the directive of the board 
risk management committee. A risk management team should be established to offer 
oversight management’s activities in handling credit, market, liquidity, operational, 






In addition, Nigerian Code Corporate Governance (NCCG) (2011) states that the Board 
of any company may form a risk management group to contribute the risk function or 
profile, risk management outline and the risk-reward system to be determined by the 
Board of Directors (BOD). Risk is a day to day activity of any business entity. Scholars 
suggest that organizational success could be enhanced if there is good management 
committee in place. success of company largely depends on the risk management 
mechanism (Akindele, 2012). 
 
The common purpose for supporting financial performance discussions and research is 
because growing financial performance analysis will provide improvement in processes 
and responsibility of the organization (Nimalathasan, 2008). However, determining firm 
performance has been a main task for scholars and practitioners (Simerly and Li 2000). 
Performance is a multidimensional construct and thus, any one proxies may not be able 
to provide a complete thoughtful of the performance relationship relative to the ideas of 
interest (Chakravathy, 1986). 
 
There are a different of measures used to assess bank performance, with every team of 
stakeholders having its particular focus of interest (Khrawish 2011). Altman and 
Hotchkiss (2010) stated that ratio analysis is a depiction of the true picture of 
performance of a business at a point. Despite the importance of financial ratio analysis 
in providing valuable knowledge to an entity’s performance, it has some significant 





performance parameters is required to reveal the various features of the bank 
performance (Gibson & Cassar, 2005). 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
Corporate Governance, risk Management, and financial performance are significant 
concepts among banks due to their involvement in the financial intermediation process. 
Acknowledging this, several interventions, legal regulatory, have been undertaken to 
address weaknesses in risk management and corporate governance mechanisms in 
banks. 
 
In Nigeria, poor management result in excessive risk taking, inadequate administration 
of loans portfolio and distorted credit management, was among a factor causes of 
banking distress (Sanusi, 2010). The problem of corporate governance is crucial in the 
banking sector and has turned into a topic of global concern, it is essential to improve 
services and strengthening of financial intermediation with respect to banks and enables 
appropriate banking operations. 
 
Good corporate governance practices in the banks have a lot to do with knowledgeable 
expert and competent staff expected to develop and deliver satisfactory banking 
products and services to the customers. To this end, a competent Framework for the 
Nigerian Banking Industry, with inputs from the Bankers’ Committee, was distributed 





and proficiencies needed for various tasks in the banking sector. Banks are still being 
performed by people without having the minimum qualification in some of the banks. 
The observed loopholes in the framework may have given room for this practice. 
 
Boards of directors is the focus of attention for most fraud cases that result to collapse 
of many companies, also blamed for corporate failure and the decrease in shareholders‟ 
wealth. In 2009, the banking sector in Nigeria widely reported many accounting 
irregularities. Such as, spring Bank, Fin Bank, Afri Bank, Union Bank, Oceanic Bank 
and Intercontinental Bank was because of lack of good supervision roles by the board, 
the board give control to executive management who were after their own self-interests 
(Uadiale, 2010). 
 
However, 8 of 24 banks in Nigerian were identified by the Central Bank of Nigeria as 
distressed, with total 32.8% as nonperforming loans (Alabede 2012). The chief 
executives and directors of the banks were removed by the central bank of Nigeria 
(CBN) as a result of corporate financial misconduct and 4.1 billion Naira dedicated for 
bailout funds for the banks that are affected (Ezeoha, 2011).1 However, the CBN 
removed some corporate executives because of taking excessive risk, as the banks 
financial executives do not align with the risk management goals. (Adegbite & 
Nakajima, 2011). Vives (2011) explain that agency problem makes the financial 
industry shows severe market failure arising from too much risk-taking. Insufficient 
corporate governance in banks is the main concern of regulators in protecting banking 
                                                             





funds (Adegbite, 2012). The major issue in Nigerian financial institutions is that of some 
corporate financial leaders have no corporate governance strategies to ensure regulatory 
compliance to enhance firm financial performance. 
 
Governance misconduct among the merged banks has been related to banking distress 
in Nigeria, which has turn to routine practice in the sector Sanusi (2010). Additionally, 
corporate governance has failed in many banks because boards are being misinformed 
by the executive in acquiring loans that are not secured and they lack experience to 
impose good corporate governance practice on the management. 
 
Better educational levels are recognized as assisting in the better management of firms 
and with greater receptiveness to innovation, as highlighted by Kimberly and Evanisko 
(1981). The expertise of directors, such as accounting, consulting, financing and law, 
all support management in the making of decisions.  Wiersema and Bantel (1992) 
suggested that a greater level of education can be related with higher data-processing 
capability and the capacity to discriminate amongst alternate stimuli. 
 
Board independence from management is important for a board’s monitoring ability. 
Minton, Tailard and Williamson (2010) discovered that risk committee members 
independence decreases insiders risk taking activities resulting to a decline in losses 
specifically in financial crisis. Tao and Hutchinson (2012) describe that, strategies will 
be put in place to protect the company and there will be proper monitoring and control 




One of the advantages of having risk management committee in a bank is to assess and 
bring about any potentially catastrophic risks and operational risks. This has created a 
proper communication channel relating to risk assessment and avoidance whether 
horizontal or vertical. It provides guidelines and policies to govern the processes by 
which evaluation and supervision is handled by having an expert with experience in 
identifying, assessing and managing risk coverage oversight, and complicated 
organisational risk committee. This help to avoid any risk which have portent and 
undesirable efforts on the corporation’s performance. 
 
Murphy (2011) suggests that risk committee must be separated from audit committees, 
as the former contain both prospective and retrospective dimension. The Central Bank 
of Nigeria (CBN) code of corporate governance 2014, each bank should have a risk 
management agenda identifying the governance structure, procedure, policies, and 
process for the monitoring, and control of the risk contain in its operations. One of the 
profits of having risk management committee in a company is to evaluate and manage 
any potentially catastrophic risks and operational risks. 
 
Thus, this study will investigate the effect of board expertise, and risk management 








1.3 Research Questions 
 
Therefore, from the problems stated in the problem statement section, this research 
highlights on addressing the following questions that emerges within the study context: 
1. What is the relationship between risk management committee size and financial 
performance of quoted banks in Nigeria? 
2. What is the relationship between risk management committee independence and 
financial performance of quoted banks in Nigeria? 
3. What is the relationship between board financial expertise and financial performance 
of quoted banks in Nigeria? 
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
 
The focus of this research is to investigate the effect of board financial expertise, and 
risk management committee characteristics on the financial performance of quoted 
banks in Nigeria. Precisely, the following objectives have been identified; 
1. To examine the relationship between risk management committee size and financial 
performance of listed banks in Nigeria. 
2. To examine the relationship between risk management committee independence and 
financial performance of listed banks in Nigeria. 
3. To examine the relationship between board financial expertise and financial 






1.5 Significance of the Study 
 
The results of this research will make contribution to the procedure and practice by 
improving understanding the mechanisms through which corporate governance 
influence bank financial performance. Policy makers can progress guidelines to be 
implemented by bank in corporate governance and risk management to improve 
financial performance. Practitioners can implement best practices in risk management 
and corporate governance in order to maximize the shareholder value. Hence, these 
guidelines will help directors to follow in order to improve the wellbeing of the banks. 
 
This study will give board of directors the information which they will use in comparing 
the performance of their banks, with other banks. Managers will understand from this 
study on how current Nigerian codes of corporate governance will rise the performance 
in Nigerian banking sector. This research will educate bank management the positive 
effect of corporate governance on financial performance of banks. This research will 
benefit academicians as reference material for further research, it will provides 
understanding the level to which banks are fulfilling with different section that of the 
codes of best practice and the area they face problems. The research would provide the 
structure which the government could take right policies on corporate governance and 
other code of best practice in order to move the economy forward to compete with their 






1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study 
 
The study will concentrate on the banks which are quoted in the Nigerian stock 
exchange and the research cover the 15 banks that were quoted and traded on the main 
board of the Nigeria stock exchange from 2013 - 2016. The reason for choosing this 
sector is because, the stability in the banking sector is important, and banks are vital 
institutions that sustain the payment of an economy. The scope of risk management 
committee characteristics involves the risk management committee size and risk 
management committee independence and board financial expertise. With regards to 
bank financial performance, this study focused on three measurement of accounting 
performance: return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and Tobin’s Q to 
determine the financial performance of banks in Nigeria. 
  
 1.7 Organization of the Thesis  
 
This chapter starts with a discussion about financial scandals and the recent corporate 
failure across the globe that has affected many companies and shows the importance of 
having a sound and good corporate governance regulation. The chapter highlights the 
status of setting a separate risk management committee as it will help in monitoring risk 
activities for the organisation.  The chapter has various sections that encompass the 
study of the background, the main aims of the study as well as objectives of the research 
at a glance. The study seeks to address in solving existing problems, and the contribution 
of the study in creating an understanding of a country’s regulator on the role of the board 
of directors and risk management committee. The last section gives an overview of the 








This chapter reviews the work of other scholars on corporate governance and the 
findings of prior studies and underpinning theories. It comprises a complete discussion 
on corporate governance concept with a view to identify the corporate governance 
evolution in Nigeria, the importance of corporate governance, the principle and 
compliance of corporate governance, corporate  governance code of top practices for 
banks post association, corporate governance legislation: an overview of Nigerian 
banking industry, corporate governance and bank failure, causes of corporate 
governance and bank distress in Nigeria and concept of bank financial performance will 
be discussed. Finally, this section will be identified and discussed the theoretical 
framework of the study. 
 
2.2 Concept of corporate governance 
Corporate governance is multidimensional. It focusses the different fields such as 
accountancy, economics, finance, and others (Olannye & David, 2014). Corporate 
governance is among the important factors which determine organisation financial 
strength and the capacity to survive economic shocks. Fundamental accuracy of 
personal working and the connections between them help in building the strength of an 
organisation. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) explain the important factors that sustain 
country’s financial system the stability which include: effective marketing discipline; 




prudential regulation and supervision; disclosure regimes that is sound and suitable 
savings deposit system. 
 
Corporate governance rotates around some important aspect such as management team 
responsibility, board of directors’ structure, their remuneration, director ownership, 
functions of services of institutional directors, enterprise freedom availability, 
accountability of member of board of directors, financial reporting, institutionalization 
of audit functions and linkage with shareholders. Sound corporate governance will 
enhance value by enabling best corporate management which will benefit shareholders 
(Rehmans & Mangla, 2010). 
 
Various scholars and practitioners define corporate governance. Although they all have 
same conclusion, so they agree with it. Hence, corporate governance is the association 
between the shareholders and enterprise or the relationship of the enterprise to society 
in general. (Coleman and Nicholas-Biekpe , 2006) .However, Mayer (1999) defined as 
the processes, information, and structures used for monitoring and control of 
organization management. 
 
According to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
corporate governance is a scheme that direct and control business. Governance structure 
stipulates the distribution of rights and duties between the various members in the 
organisation, such as shareholders, managers, and other stakeholders, and explain 




Nevertheless, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and Vives (2000) discover a wider method 
which interpret the subject as the means through which managers are control by finance 
providers so that their capital cannot be taken and to earn a return on their investment. 
However, there is contract that broader view of corporate governance should be 
accepted regarding banking institutions because of its nature which required that 
corporate governance mechanisms for banks should summarize depositors and 
shareholders (Macey & O‟Hara, 2001). 
 
2.3 The Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance 
In Nigeria, majority of studies agreed on corporate failures because of poor corporate 
governance system and its implementation by the Security and exchange Commission 
(SEC) in Nigeria in developing and issuing several corporate governance codes for the 
drive controlling and monitoring the behaviour of management and its board members 
(Idemudia, 2011; Adegbite et al., 2012). 
 
The commission are held with the responsibilities of issuance and revelation of any 
weaknesses in the corporate governance code 2003 and 2008 and arrive at revised codes 
of corporate governance 2011 which is assumed will guarantee uppermost ethics of 
good governance mechanism and which will enhance transparency and accountability 
in operations of corporations in Nigeria. The code was developed particularly to be 
applied by the public limited companies; however, the board of the commission (SEC) 
has included all other business venture such as private corporations, small and medium 




The board committee members must determine the degree to which its obligation, 
function besides the duty they should carried out as set in commission code via its’ 
committees. 
 
The board could, notwithstanding have an audit committee as suggested by Companies 
and Allied Matters Act (CAMA, 1990), similarly they can constitute 
governance/compensation committee, risk management committees and other 
recommended committees as believed by the board of directors that would enhance the 
entity’s value depend on the sitting of the organisations (Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011) 
 
2.4 Corporate Governance Regulation in Nigeria 
Corporate governance has encountered different problems and was ignored for a lengthy 
period, in both government regulatory bodies and the academicians in Nigeria (Ranti, 
2011). For each company being incorporated in Nigeria, whether public or private 
liability companies, quoted on the Security Exchange Commotion (SEC) and 
International Stock Exchange Markets (ISEM) globally, or not listed at all but in 
accordance with the provisions and in conformity with the (CAMA, 1990). 
 
There are many arrangements or provisions in CAMA 1990 that set a guideline for good 
corporate governance, these incorporate among others, the rights of shareholders, the 
duties and rights of the board of directors, board attributes and its composition, the 





The Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) is another body of regulation in Nigeria that 
charged with the responsibility of incorporating companies and giving rules to the best 
possible operation of the incorporated organizations. Investment and Securities Act 
(ISA 1999) is likewise one of the regulations in Nigeria that permits SEC to control the 
activities of all incorporated firms in Nigeria, the outcome of these bodies on corporate 
governance includes among others the Code of corporate governance for public 
incorporated companies (2003 and 2011). Furthermore, every bank in Nigeria is liable 
to the direction of Banks and other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA 1991). BOFIA 
1991 provides the Central Bank of Nigeria authority to enrol and manage Banks and 
other Financial Institutions (Ranti, 2011). Since 2011 there have been numerous 
controls and executions of corporate governance by NSE and CBN. The last adjustment 
of International Financial Reporting Standards in Nigeria is additionally another effort 
in attempting to improve the effectiveness corporate governance. 
 
2.5 Concept of bank financial performance 
The composition of financial ratios, benchmarking, and performance measurement 
against target are been used mostly in measuring the banks financial performance and 
other financial institution (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, & Lafond, 2009). The 
publish financial statement of banks normally disclose many financial ratios meant to 
provide banks performance indication.  
 
There are constraints in accounting related to choosing some of the financial ratios. This 




performance of quoted banks in Nigeria. Furthermore, return on assets (ROA) permits 
analyst and all stakeholders a means to evaluate the performance and corporate 
governance system of an organisations in safeguarding and inspiring efficient 
governance of the corporation. While ROE is a percentage that discloses a financial 
performance of a firm on how much profit an organisation generated i.e. income 
generated before interest charges divided by the total shareholders’ equity for the same 
period. Whereas Tobin’s Q is a progressive measure of financial performance as it 
captures the market related information about the activities of a firm (Mukhopadhyay 
& Chakraborty, 2017). 
 
Simply expressed, the existing financial performance literature portrays the aim of 
financial establishments as that of acquiring satisfactory returns and reducing the risk 
consider procuring the return (Bhagat & Black, 2000). Klein (1998) applied return on 
assets (ROA) while Lo, Wong & Firth (2010) used return on equity (ROE) as an 
indicator of measuring performance or performance indicators. Brown and Caylor 
(2009) they applied ROE and ROA as their two measures of performance indicators. 
We can measure firms’ performance through the ROA proportion which shows the 
amounts of income have produced from assets or capital invested (Epps & Cereola, 
2008). 
 
Most past studies relating to organization performance assessment concentrate just on 
operational effectiveness and operational efficiency which may notwithstanding impact 




envelopment analysis model in their research, the experimental outcome of this study 
shows that an organization with good effectiveness does not generally imply it has better 
efficiency. In banking sector, financial statements of banks can be measured by a 
collection of financial ratios prepare to present a genuine picture of company's 
performance. 
 
The reason why this study focus on financial performance is because information 
disclose in the annual report of banks are based on the facts and accountability that was 
used to improved and heightened project support for the executive strategy, better 
services and satisfaction are being provided to a customer. 
 
2.6 Underpinning Theories 
This section discusses the theories that underpin the entire study. Several theories have 
been used by previous CG writers and some of which include agency theory, transaction 
cost theory, ethical theories, institutional theory and host of others. This study, however, 
employing agency theory and resource dependency theory because of their prominence 
in the recent times and, they are related to variables of this research. 
 
2.6.1 Agency Theory 
                
Economic theory is the root of agency theory and is widely used in corporate governance 
studies. Agency theory is illustrating as the “relationship between the principals, such 
as shareholders and agents such as the company executives and managers”. Based on 




work for them. owners allocate the running of business to the managers, who are the 
agent of the shareholders (Clarke, Cull, Peria, & Sánchez, 2005). 
 
In agency theory agents are projected to help and make decision in the interest of 
shareholders. Adam Smith in the 18th century first highlighted such problem and later 
study by Ross (1973), and the comprehensive explanation of agency theory was offered 
first by (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The agency theory describes the separation of 
ownership and control (Davis et al., 1997).  
 
The Agency theory also defines the effectiveness and efficient monitoring of the risk 
management committee as prescribed in the code of governance with regards to its size 
and the independence. However, the theory advocates or argues that a considerable raise 
in number of risk management committee size can result to a delay in the decision-
making process, which could also increase administrative cost of governance and 
independence of risk management committee will increase the monitoring of the 
executive with regards to risk taking activities (Fama & Jensen 1983).  
 
2.6.2 Resource dependency theory 
    
Resource dependency theory is another important theory in this study. The theory is 
used to augment agency theory as it postulates the primary role of appointing directors 
is for the directors to link their firms with external stakeholders through which the 
resources desired to boost the performance of the firm can be derived. Hillman, Canella 
and paetzold (2000) also opined that the main trust of resource dependency theory 




organizational resources are provided and secured through effective communications 
with the outside world. 
The main postulation of resource dependency theory is that board members are 
specifically appointed with the primary purpose of increasing the supply of resources 
that are essential to the firm (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Moreover, the theory also 
postulates that non-executive directors connect the firm with outsiders through their 
knowledge, prestige and contacts. In addition, Spencer (1983) argued that non-executive 
directors regularly view them self as advisors instead of being decision makers, which, 
therefore, makes them highly influential and attracts the attention of people even though 
they do not institute policy ( Haniffa & Hudaib ,2006). 
In line with debate above, the resource dependency theory provides adequate support 
for sources through which a firm gathers resources to improve its operations and such 
source could be either external or internal in nature. The theory discusses the attributes 
of board of directors, audit committee and risk committee, as these factors have not been 
explored in detail by the agency theory in relationship to the firm performance. In 
conclusion, the combination of agency and resource dependency theory in this study 






2.7. Corporate Governance Structure 
2.7.1 RMC Size 
Risk management committee existence may be related with board size. The existence 
of large board size gives more opportunities to discover directors with needed expertise 
to organise and be in charge in a sub-team dedicated to risk management. risk 
management committee size is referred as number of members sitting on the risk 
management committee (Ballesta & Garcia-Meca, 2005). 
 
Board of directors of banks are important to corporate governance activities (Adams & 
Mehran 2003). The boards of directors established up monitoring committees that 
moderate the cost related with larger boards (Upadhyay, Bhargava & Faircloth, 2014). 
thus, larger boards have been related with performance (Adams & Mehran, 2005), and 
greater bank risk taking (IMF, 2014). Consistent with prior studies (Beltratti and Stulz, 
2012; Peni & Vähämaa, 2012) investigation of a sample of financial institutions 
indicated that firms with shareholder-focused boards are related with greater levels of 
systemic risk or lower returns 
 
A board primary duty is to deliver an effective monitoring function (Fleischer, Hazard 
& Klipper, 1988). According to Bédard et al. (2004) a big committee offer strength, 
expertise and diversity of view which is effective in terms of resolving potentials 
problems. Risk oversight arrangement seek to diminish structural features that can 
hamper external shareholders’ ability to monitor banks effectively, given the 




of directors in banks play a key role in regulation of risk controls to reduce misconduct 
in financial institutions (Nguyen, Hagendorff & Eshraghi 2015a). Precisely, they report 
mitigated bank misconduct levels when monitoring quality is high.  
 
2.7.2 RMC Independence 
Board independence from management is important for a board’s monitoring ability. 
The presence of large number of non-executive directors sitting on the board is 
recognised as a good pointer of the independence of the board from management. Prior 
research (Dalton et al., 1998; Shleifer and Vishny, 1996) shows that boards cannot 
enquire and fight the power of the executive management if they are not sufficiently 
independence from management. The responsibility of independent executive directors 
is to control the manger’s behaviour that are related to risk taking activities. Thus, it is 
argued that non-executive care more about their status, so they will demand higher 
quality governance than executive directors. Uzun et, al (2004) states that organisation 
with a greater number of non-executive directors have good management and fewer 
fraud accusations. 
 
According to fama and Jensen, (1983) RMC independence means the number of 
independent non-executive directors’ members sitting on the risk management 
committee. Subramaniam, McManus, and Zhang (2009) stated that boards with 
excessive number of non-executive directors are able vigorously investigate about risks, 
and they see the setting up of a risk management committee as a vital means of support 




a small number of non-executive director. Tao and Hutchinson, (2012) explain, when a 
committee is comprising of independent directors, they will be able to monitor, and 
control management and risk-taking activities to ensure all the strategies are working.  
 
However. Minton, Tailard and Williamson (2010) discover that risk committee 
members independence reduces insiders risk taking activities resulting to reduction in 
losses particularly in financial crisis. In Nigeria the CBN 2014 code of corporate 
governance states that the risk management committee board composition shall include 
at least two non-executive directors and the executive director in control of the risk 
management, however it must be led by a non-executive director. 
 
2.7.3 Board Financial Expertise 
Better educational levels are recognized as assisting in the better management of firms 
and with greater receptiveness to innovation, as highlighted by Kimberly and Evanisko 
(1981). It is believed that individual education has relationship with conflict over 
money, and strategic vision and management control, where those who have achieved a 
greater level of education are recognized as having a good grasp of fiscal issues more 
so than those who have not sought educational attainment. 
 
However, Kesner (1988) recognised that most directors’ professions are business 
executives, with consultants, lawyers and school professors following. The directors’ 
knowledge, such as accounting, financing, consulting, and law, all support management 




education can be related with higher data-processing capability and the capacity to 
discriminate amongst alternate stimuli. Markedly, Hillman and Dalziel (2003) establish 
a relationship between director knowledge and board capital; this is seen to involve both 
social and human capital: the former refers to the implicit and tangible set of resources 
available through social relationships; the latter states to the individual abilities, skills 
and knowledge of directors, and encompasses the basic functional, board-specific and 
business-specific abilities, knowledge and skills of directors. 
 
The board of directors’ gains knowledge and insight, which is recognized as having the 
potential to improve the quality of activities carried out. Gottesman and Morey (2006) 
figures out that educational qualification may be an indicator for intelligence, where 
more smart managers are expected to be better than their peers. Top managers of the 
firm are appointed probably because of their superior ability. Bhagat et al. (2010), such 
ability consists of observable characteristics (e.g. educational backgrounds and work 
experiences). However, Cheng et al. (2010) show that the university degree held by the 
board chairman is positively related with seven measures of performance, namely 
earnings per share (EPS), ROA, cumulative returns, cumulative abnormal returns, 
growth in EPS, growth in ROA, and the market-to-book ratio.  
 
Directors with accounting and finance, economics and business education background 
are also an important person to be appointed as part of board members (Arifina, and 
Tazilahb 2016). Their attendance will support the companies to ensure financial matter 




2.8 Empirical Review of Risk management committee characteristics and board 
financial expertise on firm performance. 
 
Minton, Taillard and Williamson (2010) investigated how risk taking and bank 
Performance were correlated to board independence and financial expertise of the board 
in USA commercial banks before and through the financial crisis. They found that 
financial expertise of the board was positively linked to risk taking and bank 
Performance before the crisis but is negatively related to bank performance in the crisis. 
 
Furthermore, Adeusi, Akeke, Adebisi, and Oladunjoye (2014) investigated the 
association between bank Financial Performance in Nigeria and Risk Management 
practices. The study used secondary data gained from 4-year progressive annual reports 
and financial statements of 10 banks. A panel data estimation technique was used in the 
data analysis. The study found a significant and inverse relationship between banks 
financial performance and doubt loans as well as capital asset ratio. The study concluded 
that is a significant relationship exists between banks performance and risk 
management. 
 
The relationship between credit risk and performance of Egypt and Lebanon banks in 
the 1990s was examined Hakim and Neamie (2001) by using data from 1993-1999, the 
study used a fixed effects model of bank return with different intercepts and coefficients. 
The study confirmed that credit risk was positively related to profitability, while 




study suggested to policymakers to establish performance targets that allow bank 
managers to distribute capital more efficiently over their business units. 
 
Kleffner, Lee, and McGannon (2003) studied the use of ERM by companies in Canada, 
the characteristics that were related with the use of ERM, what problems faced 
companies in implementing ERM, and what role, if any, Corporate Governance 
procedures had played in the decision to accept ERM. Primary data was gained from 
responses to mail surveys as well as telephone interviews with the respondents. The 
results were that 31 percent of the respondents had accepted ERM, the reasons for 
approving ERM included the impact of the risk manager, inspiration from the board of 
directors, and conformity with Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) guidelines. The main 
obstacle to ERM were an organizational structure that discourage ERM and overall 
resistance to change. 
 
However, Beasley, Clune and Hermanson (2005) did an experimental study to examine 
the factors link with the stage of ERM implementation at 123 USA and international 
organizations. The results of the study were that the stage of ERM implementation was 
positively associated to the presence of a chief risk officer, board independence, CEO 
and CFO apparent support for ERM, the presence of a big four auditor, entity size, 
entities in the banking, education, and insurance industries. The study found that USA 





2.9 Gaps in the literature 
The literature reviewed in the above section has given rise to number of gaps that include 
the following: First, most of the studies on risk management committee and banks 
financial performance were conducted in developed countries that have effective and 
sound risk management committee (Murphy, 2011). There are few studies were carried 
out in Nigeria where there are weaknesses in corporate governance practice. 
 
The second gap is associated to the inconclusiveness of prior studies. The inconsistent 
findings regarding the risk management committee characteristics in advance capital 
markets gives room for further research. While some prior studies found a positive 
relationship between risk management committee characteristics and financial 
performance (see for example Upadhyay, Bhargava & Faircloth, 2014; Adams & 
Mehran, 2005; Uzun et, al 2004; Subramaniam, McManus, and Zhang 2009) some 
studies found negative relationship (see for example Pathon, 2009; Tao & Hutchinson, 
2012; Kallamu 2015) 
 
Therefore, this study is motivated by the need to fill the above identified gaps a more 
by employing a new set of variables and using a set of listed banks in Nigeria in recent 






2.10 Summary of the chapter 
This chapter brings an overview of the literature regarding the effects of risk management 
committee size, risk management committee independence, board financial expertise, on 
financial performance of banks and provides an outline of corporate governance and its 
regulation in Nigeria. The results of previous studies have shown that the effectiveness of 
the risk management committee and board financial expertise to guide the management is 
associated with firm performance. this study considered two theories which were resource 
dependency theory and agency theory to describe the relationship among CG variables and 
predicted variable firm performance measured as ROA,ROE and Tobin’s Q .Hence, this 
study focuses on financial performance because information disclose in the annual report 
of banks are based on the facts and accountability that was used to improved and 
heightened project support for the executive strategy, better services and satisfaction are 
















This chapter discusses the framework of the methods used in carrying out the study. The 
chapter is subdivided into the following heading; research design to be assumed, 
population of the study, sample size and sampling technique, sources of data and 
methods of data collection, study variables, methods to be use in analysing the data 
generate from the research instruments to be administer. 
 
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
From the review corporate governance has been seen from different theoretical 
perceptions. The main theories adopted in the study are agency theory and resource 
dependency theory as underpinning theory. Conceptual framework is normally needed 
to validate the relationship between the dependent and independent variables in the 
research (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003). In addressing that, the associated conceptual 
framework is applied to check the effects of board financial expertise and risk 
management committee on firm performance. The board financial expertise, risk 
management committee size, and risk management committee independence are the 
independent variables, whereas ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q are used as a proxy for firm 
performance which is based on accounting measure. The framework is shown 
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Figure 3.1  
Research framework  
 
3.3 Hypothesis Development 
This part discusses the relationship between the dependent variable: firm performance 
measured by ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q and the independent variable of the study. These 
independent variables include CG attributes such as risk management committee 
characteristics (risk management committee size, risk management committee 
independence) and board financial expertise.  
 
3.3.1 RMC Size and Financial Performance 
Empirical studies indicated that committee size may have implication on performance 
of the company. Halim, Mustika, Sari, Anugerah, and Mohd-Sanusi (2017) explain that 
large board size is assumed to help the performance of the board in implementing risk 
management and overseeing the performance of the agent, therefore, the agent does not 
Financial Performance:  
Return on assets (ROA) 
Return on equity (ROE) 
Tobin’s Q 
 
Risk management committee 
size 
Risk management committee 
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trespass the authority that has been given by the principal. A larger board size will 
deliver greater chance to discover members with the required expertise to organise and 
be involved in the committees formed by the Board of Commissioners designated for 
risk management (Subramaniam et al., 2009). 
 
good performance is positively associated with presence of risk management 
committee. However, RMC size is important in handling the risk of finance companies 
and increasing their performance (Tao & Hutchinson (2012). This is further supported 
by Battaglia and Gallo (2015) that risk committee size and ROA has a positive 
relationship. They recommend that for the period 2007-2011, banks having a bigger risk 
committee achieve higher profitability. Also, Wu, Kweh, Lu, and Azizan (2016) found 
that risk management committee characteristics including the number of directors sitting 
on the risk management committee are positively and significantly associated to the 
effectiveness of Malaysian insurers. 
 
Additionally, Rao, and Jirra (2017) in their study shows a positive relationship between 
risk committee size and liquidity risk management in Commercial banks. The findings 
of this study indicated, Ethiopian commercial banks board of subcommittee, especially 
risk committee size play a crucial role in effective direction of the risk management in 
banking industry. Therefore, the banks should give due consideration to the size of risk 
committee in board room. 
H1: There is a positive relationship between RMC Size and financial performance 




3.3.2 RMC Independence and Financial Performance 
Individuals’ quality that serve on the RMC is a key sign for affective monitoring of risk 
matters. The committee efficiency is based on the composition of the committee. Risk 
committee is seen to be more effective when the composition of the committee members 
come from outside of the company or they are independent members because they have 
the motivation to protect their reputation as expert (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
 
Also, agency theory recommends that independent of committee members is one of the 
factors that have influence on the effectiveness of the committee (carson, 2002). From 
the agency theory perspective independent risk management committee members will 
be able to screen any self-interested behaviour by managers and lower agency cost 
(Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). Independence of the risk management committee members 
will enable them to deal with any management pressure and acquire the essential 
information for controlling risk of the companies which will improve supervision and 
control of the company’s risk and eventually improved firm performance (Yeh, Chung, 
& Liu, 2011). 
 
Empirical studies indicate that a relationship exist between risk management committee 
independence and firm performance. Pathon (2009) found a negative relationship 
between RMC members’ independence and risk in finance companies. The negative 
relation could be related to lack of supervision monitoring by independent executive 
director because of busy schedule or lack of experience required to carry out the 




(2015) reported that risk management committee independence is significantly 
negatively linked with ROA.  
 
Financial firms with large number of independent directors sitting on risk committee do 
well in financial crisis period and they are better than those with small independent 
directors (Yeh et al. (2011)). However, Xie et al. (2003) explain that non-executive 
board members tend to reduce the probability of a company being involve in accounting 
fraud. Also, Wu, et al. (2016) found that the percentage of independent directors sitting 
on risk management committee are positively and significantly interrelated with the 
effectiveness of Malaysian insurers. 
 
H2: There is a positive relationship between RMC independence and financial 
performance of quoted banks in Nigeria. 
 
3.3.3 Board Financial Expertise and Financial Performance 
Board members who reached a greater level of education are considered as having a 
better grasp of fiscal issues than those who do not have higher education. Since boards 
are charged with ensuring that the funds of shareholders are not misused, shareholders 
must make sure that the board members are both experienced and well-educated. 
Directors’ competency and background are important elements as they positively 
contribute to companies’ values (Johannisson & Huse, 2000). 
 
The expertise of directors in areas such as accounting, financing, consulting, and law all 




that a greater level of education can be related with higher data-processing capability 
and the capacity to discriminate between alternate stimuli. Hillman and Dalziel (2003) 
linked director knowledge and human capital individual abilities, knowledge, and skills 
of directors that encompass the basic functional, board and business-specific abilities, 
knowledge and skills of directors. Chen et al. (2005) emphasized that intellectual capital 
adds significant value to firm profitability. Switzer and Huang (2007) who sampled 
mutual funds in Canada, established that the mutual funds’ performance can be related 
directly with aspects of managerial human capital. 
H3: There is a positive relationship between board financial expertise and financial 
performance. 
 
3.4. Research Design 
 
Research design includes evaluation and collection of data. This is dictated by the 
research nature. It includes building up reliability and validity of the study. The main 
aim of the research design is to determine the relationship that occurs among the 
research questions, the data collected and to draw conclusion (Asika, 2004). This study 
collects and utilize documentary source of data acquired from the annual reports and 









3.5 Measurement of the Variables 
 
Dependent variables, independent variable, and control variable measurement is 
provided under this section. The will measure the variables as follows: 
 
3.5.1 Dependent Variable 
 
The study applies financial performance as dependent variable measured by return on 
asset (ROA), return on equity (R0E). Besides this study also employ Tobin’s Q as 
indicator on market performance. 
 
ROA is the accounting-based measurement and it shows the overall efficiency of assets 
utilization by the firm in terms of improving the wealth of shareholders. Various 
companies have different ROA representing measurements of efficient utilization of 
assets (Miller 1995). 
 
ROA is measured as net income generated before interest expenses for the fiscal year 
divided by total assets for that same year. It defines the ability of bank management in 
investments of its assets, buildings and land, inventory and stocks. Higher ROA means 
the bank is more efficient and capable of using the funds (Wen, 2010). Therefore, the 
higher the ROA, the more effective is the utilization of assets to satisfy the shareholders' 
interests (Ibrahim & Samad, 2011). 
 
While ROE is a measure that discloses a financial performance of a firm on how much 




by the total shareholders’ equity for the same period. However, ROE is about the salary 
before intrigue cost for the monetary period isolated by aggregate shareholders' value 
for that same period. 
 
ROE emphases on the equity section of the investment and determine that the earnings 
left over for equity investors after debt service cost have been factored into the equity 
invested in assets (Damodaran, 2007). 
 
Additionally, Tobin’s Q is a forward-looking measure of financial performance as it 
captures the market related information about the activities of a firm (Mukhopadhyay 
& Chakraborty,2017). This measure uses the basic stock market price, which shows the 
predictable projections of a firm (Skousen et al.,2002). Hence, Tobin’s Q reflects the 
expectation of the shareholders with respect to the future performance of an 
organisation, which is based on current or past performance. 
 
Tobin’s Q is characterised to depict the perception of the market with respect to whether 
the firm performance is good or not. Thus, Tobin’s Q is illustrated as market value of 
the firm divided by total assets. A high Tobin’s Q ratio signifies the successful 
deployment of a firm resources because a firm has higher market value than its book 
value (Kapopoulos & Lazaretou, 2007). 
 
One measure concerning financial performance that is used namely ROA to differentiate 




have on the types of financial performance. Therefore, ROA is described as net income 
generated before interest expenses divided by total assets for that same year (Garba & 
Abubakar 2014; Makki & Lodhi (2014). As well ROE is measured as net income 
divided by total equity (Taghizadeh & Saremi, 2013) while TQ is given as market value 
of the firm divide by total assets (Martin and Hero (2018) and Vintil et al. (2015). 
 
3.5.2 Independent Variables 
 
The section gives measurements of the board financial expertise and risk management 
committee characteristics as independent variables which are state as follows: 
 
3.5.2.1 RMC Size 
 
Risk management committee existence may be linked with board size. The existence of 
large board size gives more opportunities to discover directors with needed expertise to 
organise the risk management. Risk management committee size is measure as the 
number of directors sitting on the risk management committee (Ballesta & Garcia-Meca, 
2005). 
 
3.5.2.2 RMC Independence 
 
Risk committee members independence decreases risk taking activities of management, 
this result to a reduction in losses particularly in financial crisis period (Minton, Tailard 
& Williamson 2010). Risk management committee independence is measure as the 
proportion of non-executive directors divided by total directors on the risk committee 




3.5.2.3 Board Financial Expertise 
 
Board financial expertise are recognized as assisting in the better management of firms 
and with greater receptiveness to innovation, as highlighted by Kimberly and Evanisko 
(1981). The expertise of directors, such as accounting, consulting, financing and law, 
all support management in the making of decisions. It is defined as proportion of 
directors with educational background in accounting, finance, economics, and business 
administration divided by total directors (Dionne & Triki 2005). 
 
3.5.3 Control Variables 
 
This section provides firm size, bank age, and leverage as the control variables. 
A) Firm Size 
Empirical literature of corporate governance used firm size as control variable in 
measuring the performance of the firm (Aljifri & Moustafa, 2007; Alzharani et al., 
2011). This study uses firm size as control variable because it is discovered to be related 
to firm with different features. 
 
Firm size has influence on company performance. Empirical literature on corporate 
governance used it as a control variable, as in De Andres et al. (2005), Linck, Netter    
and Yang (2008) and (Ghosh, 2006). Large firms may be less active compare to smaller 
firms because they can meet the government bureaucracy, and more agency problems 
(Lehn et al., 2009). Although, there is a possibility to use economies of scale, more 
powerful on the market, and employ more skilled managers (Kyereboah-Coleman & 




when firm is growing to assist in monitor the performance of managers. Finally, this 
study measure firm size by using the natural logarithm of the total assets (Alhaji 2012; 
Kurawa & Kabara, 2014)  
 
B) Bank Age 
 
Bank age is measure using number of years the bank is incorporated. As organizations 
age, routines, systems, and standard operating procedures are consciously created or 
otherwise emerge (Blau & Scott, 1962). Several empirical studies generally used bank 
age as a control variable which studied the relationship between corporate governance 





Leverage means the utilisation of funds borrowed to enhance firm performance. Some 
empirical studies have used leverage widely as a control variable to study the association 
between corporate governance and financial performance for instance, Habbash, (2010); 
Adelopo, (2011) and Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, (2006). These studies indicate 
that debt has an impact on company financial performance.  
 
Leverage is used as control variables because of it is important to control the chances of 
the spurious relationship among the variables (board financial knowledge, risk 




performance). Greater debt level can increase agency costs and decreases managerial 
cost that could made to provide more level of disclosure in annual reports and enhances 
firm performance (Mangena & Pike, 2005). 
Agency theory assumed that the level of the increase in leverage increases the efficiency 
of the board. Jensen and Meckling (1976) explain that leverage must be use by the 
company to help control the costs such as debt levels rise to agency. Managers can offer 





















Summary of the Operationalization of Research Variables 





















Net profit divided 










2 Return on equity ROE Net profit after tax 






































5 Risk management 
committee 
independence 
RMCINDE Proportion of non-
executive directors 
divided by total 











































Kabara (2014)  
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Total debts divided 








3.6 Population of the Study 
 
This study involves all banks listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. So, the study 
population covers all fifteen (15) listed banks from 2013 to 2016 in accordance with the 
Central Bank of Nigeria regulation. 
 
3.6.1 Sample Size and Sampling Technique  
 
From the population fifteen (15) banks listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange which are 









Listed Banks in Nigeria 
   No. Commercial Banks in Nigeria 
1 Access Bank Plc 
2 Diamond Bank Plc 
3 Ecobank Nigeria Plc 
4 Fidelity Bank 
5 First City Monument Bank Plc 
6 First Bank of Nigeria Plc 
7 Guarantee Trust Bank Plc 
8 Sterling Bank Plc 
9 Stanbic-IBTC Bank Plc 
10 United Bank for Africa 
11 Unity Bank Plc 
12 Union Bank Plc 
13 Wema Bank Plc 
14 Zenith Bank Plc 
Source: Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) 2016 
 
It is observed that these banks are homogeneous, and the patterns of preparing and 
reporting their financial statements in which findings can be generalized are almost 
similar.  
 
3.7. Sources of Data and Methods of Data Collection  
 
The data that used for the study is secondary data that acquired from the annual reports 
and audited financial statements of listed banks in Nigeria. Even though the accuracy of 
financial statements mostly relies on the integrity of the banks, and diligence exercised 
by different supervisory authorities, it is considered that these statements are highly 
reliable because the data are going to be sourced from various avenues especially the 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) publications like annual reports, securities and exchange 





3.8. Method of Data Analysis 
 
The data for this study is derived from one source, i.e documentary sources, different 
statistical tests is carrying out to determine the link between the variables in the study. 
Multiple regression technique is used to correlate the relationship between dependent 
and independent variables. The regression model focused on Risk management 
committee size (RMCSIZE), Risk management committee independence (RMCINDE), 
Board financial expertise (BOARDFINEXP), Return on Asset (ROA), return on equity 
(ROE) and Tobin’s Q (TQ). 
 
3.8.1 Model Specification and Multiple Regressions  
 
Multiple regression method is carried out to study the link between the financial 
performance of quoted banks in Nigeria and risk management size, risk management 
independence and board financial knowledge. 
 
The regression equation is estimated as follow: 
ROA = α0 + β1 rmcsize + β2 rmcindr + β3 Bfknexp + β4 lnta + β5 agecorp + β6 
tdta + ε it  
ROE = α0 + β1 rmcsize + β2 rmcindr + β3 Bfknexp + β4 lnta + β5 agecorp + β6 
tdta + ε it  
TQ= α0 + β1 rmcsize + β2 rmcindr + β3 Bfknexp + β4 lnta + β5 agecorp + β6 tdta 







roa = return on assets 
roe =return on equity 
TQ= Tobin’s Q 
rmcsize = Risk management committee size 
rmcindr = Risk management committee independence 
Bfkrexp   = Board financial expertise 
lnta = Firm size 
agecorp = Bank age 
tdta = Leverage 
ε it = Error term 
 
 
3.9 Data Analysis 
 
Stata 14 software is adopted to analyse the data which includes of descriptive statistics 
that gives details and summary to be collected from the annual statement of Nigerian 
banks. 
 
3.9.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 
Descriptive analysis was conducted to minimse the mean, minimum, maximum, and 
standard deviation for each variable of the sample selected in the study. 
 
3.9.2 Diagnostic Test Panel Data Analysis 
 
Normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation are the common 
diagnostic tests to be conducted before analysis and econometric modelling can be done 
(Carneiro, 2006). These four (4) tests were to be conducted in this study to prove that 





3.9.2.1 Normality Test 
 
Normality is defined as the shape of the distribution of data for individual quantitative 
data variable and its normal distribution. It is a fundemental assumption in multivariate 
analysis that follows the idea that a significant deviation from normality result to an 
invalid statistical outcome (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006). 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) explain that the distribution shape can be observed on a 
graph. For this study Shapiro-Wilk, Shapiro-Francia, Mardia Skeness Henze-Zirkler 
and Kernel Density Estimator were to be use respectively. 
 
3.9.2.2 Heteroscedasticity Test 
 
Heteroscedasticity test of a group of variances is required in the panel data analysis 
because such analysis is the consolidation of cross-sectional data and time series. There 
are many heteroscedasticity tests available, namely, Spearman’s Rank Correlation, 
Goldfeld-Quandt Test, the Breush-Pagan Goldfrey Test, Glejser Test, Park Test, and 
White Heteroscedasticity Test. Consequently, Gujarati and Porter (2009) observe that 
there is no answer for the best and most powerful test to diagnose the problem. Greene 
(2003) recommended using the White Heteroscedasticity Test. The Whites test itself has 
many alternatives and the choice of such a test depends on the statistical package used. 
In the panel data analysis using Stata statistical software, a modified Wald test for group 
wise heteroscedasticity in the residuals could measure heterogeneity from the 







3.9.2.3 Autocorrelation Test 
 
Another diagnostic test that is relevant to the panel data analysis includes checking the 
correlation among the disturbance term of observations in time or space (Gujarati & 
Porter, 2009). In the panel data analysis, the test to determine the existence of 
autocorrelation in the panel is based on the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation 
(Carneiro, 2006). The test involves checking the significance of null hypothesis that 
there is no idiosyncratic error of a linear panel data model. The significant F-value 
shows the existence of autocorrelation in the model. This problem can be solved by 
using the random effect model or the fixed effects model since the model always 
provides consistent estimators (Gujarati & Porter, 2009; Wooldridge, 2003). 
 
3.9.2.4 Multicollinearity Test 
 
Panel data analysis, to some extent, can reduce the multicollinearity problem (Baltagi, 
Bratberg & Holmås, 2005). Multicollinearity checking is a common diagnostic test to 
confirm that none of the independent variables are highly linked, which can result in 
massive variance bias. The high correlation between two (2) independent variables 
would result in a huge bias in variance, therefore, causing the estimations to be 
unreliable (Baltagi et al., 2005). The Variance inflation Factor (VIF) is an example of 
the test that is common to study such a problem. It treats one (1) of the independent 
variables as dependent variables and the remaining independent variables as 
independent variables. Correlation Matrix and Condition Index are other tests that have 




carrying out a multicollinearity test for the panel data, one (1) of the basic requirements 




The current study identifies the interconnection among the variables. The result of the 
analyses shows the direction, significance, and nature of the correlation of the variables 
in the study and this relationship is analysed using the person correlation. 
 
3.9.4 Panel Data Analysis 
 
According to Baltagi et al. (2005), panel data refers to the pooling of observations on a 
cross section over several times. Thus, allowing the researcher to study the dynamics of 
change over the short time series. In this study, due to the potential benefits provided by 
this approach panel data structure rather than cross sectional or time series will be 
utilize, it can improve the quantity and quality of data that could not be provided with 
either a cross sectional or a time series alone (Greene, 2003). 
 
The advantage of panel data analysis over other techniques include reducing the 
collinearity among independent variables and increasing the number of observations 
and degree of freedom; improving the efficiency of econometrics estimation and 
account for heterogeneity of the variables as well as its suitability of studying dynamics 







3.9.4.1 Fixed Effect Model  
 
Fixed effect model displays the difference in intercepts for different entities with 
constant slope across entities and time. It can be one-way entity fixed effect, one-way 
time fixed effect or two ways fixed effects (entity and time). Two methods are 
employing; the Least Square Dummy Variable Estimator (LSDV) appropriate for small 
number of entities and Fixed Effect Estimators (FEE) appropriate for large number of 
entities (Greene, 2008). 
 
3.9.4.2 Random Effect Model  
 
For Random effect model, the variation across entities is random and uncorrelated with 
the independent variables in the model. The model can absorb time-invariant variables.  
The random effect model would have a random constant term (Greene, 2003). 
 
3.9.4.3 Hausman Test  
Hausman test is conducted to decide between random effect and fixed effect. Al-Ajmi 
(2008) explain that when the hausman test result is significant in the model fixed effect 
is preferable over random effect. 
 
3.9.4.4 Breusch and Pegan Langrangian Multiplier Test 
 
If the random effect is considered most efficient and appropriate from the above 
Hausman test, the analysis will proceed to decide between random effect model and 
pooled OLS model using Breusch and Pegan Lagrangian multiplier test. 




𝐻1: There is individual difference among the coefficients that is, random effect exists 
If the 𝐻𝑜 is rejected, random effect exists and if 𝐻𝑜 fail to be rejected, random effect 
does not exist thus pooled OLS would be more appropriate. 
 
3.9.5 Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
 
This study employs multiple linear regressions (MLR) specifically panel data analyses 
to study the relationship between the financial performance and risk management 
characteristics (risk management size, risk management independent, and board 
financial knowledge). The study clusters the standard error at panel lid. This is because 
in the sample same bank may present in different years, it is suitable to enable the errors 
to be related for the same intermediary overtime. Thus, the study obtained standard 




The objective of this study is to examine the relationship between risk management 
committee characteristics on the financial performance of quoted banks in Nigeria. This 
present chapter explains the methodology used in the study and show the hypotheses 
that have been developed. Furthermore, theoretical framework, research methodology, 







CHAPTER FOUR  




In this chapter, the results of the study are presented based on the objectives of the 
research and the hypotheses the results comprised of descriptive statistics, correlations, 
and multiple regressions that are utilized to investigate the relationship among the 
variables (independent and dependent). The data were extracted from DataStream, 
respective companies’ annual reports and analyzed using STATA. 
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive analysis was performed in order to provide demographic information 
about the sample which could lead to easy and better interpretation of data (Genser, 
Cooper, Yazdanbakhsh, Barreto, & Rodrigues, 2007). In Table 4.1, the mean and 
stander deviation of the main variables of this study are presented below. The 
continuous variables are tested by the descriptive statistics which is presented in Table 
4.1. 
 
The standard deviation, mean, maximum and minimum were included in the descriptive 
statistics which were computed using STATA version 14. Referring to Table 4.1, the 
descriptive analysis shows that the mean value of the risk management committee size 
(RMCS) is about six members with a maximum of thirteen (13) members and a 




of 20 maximum members set by central bank of Nigeria. In the same manner, the risk 
management committee with independence is 0.701 with minimum and maximum of 
29% and maximum of those with independence as all. The board financial expertise had 
a mean of 0.399 with minimum and maximum number of 17.6% and 60% respectively. 
Meanwhile bank age has a mean value of 43.929 with the minimum value of 7 years 
and maximum of 122 years of operation which indicate quite number of disparities in 
age of operations. While bank size has a mean value of 9.028billion Naira with 
minimum of about 7billion and maximum of 10billion, while the leverage value is 
having 13.383 as mean and 5.4 as minimum and 9.7 and 26 as maximum. 
Table 4.1 
Descriptive Statistics of the Continuous Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ROA 56 1.977 1.546 -5.480 4.660 
ROE 56 10.613 13.899 -56.690 29.400 
Tobin’s Q 56 0.558 0.038 0.470 0.634 
RMCS 56 6.429 2.181 3.000 13.000 
RMCI 56 0.701 0.197 0.290 1.000 
BFE 56 0.399 0.112 0.176 0.600 
BankAge 56 43.929 31.193 7.000 122.000 
Firm Size (In Billion) 56 9.028 0.639 6.891 9.794 
Leverage 56 13.383 4.732 5.390 26.160 
 
 
Finally, in the performance measures, based on descriptive analysis as summarized in 
Table 4.1, the mean value of (ROA) is 1.977 with companies that have maximum and a 
minimum level of ROA 4.660 and -5.480 respectively, and a standard deviation of 
1.546. Furthermore, the mean value of (ROE) is 10.613 with companies that have 
maximum and a minimum level of ROE 29.400 and -56.690 respectively, and a standard 
deviation of 13.899.  Thus, it can be deduced from the data that a high dispersion exists 




is 0.558 with companies that have maximum and a minimum level of Tobin-Q is 0.634 
and 0.470 respectively, and a standard deviation of 0.038. It can be inferred that a high 




Multicollinearity testing is necessary because if linear multiple exists between two or 
more independent variables, it can distort the results of multiple gradients. The main 
concern is that to increase the degree of multiple linearity, estimates of regression 
coefficients become an unstable model and standard errors of coefficients will be 
overstated. In general, there are several ways to measure multiple linearity between 
independent variables such as Pearson correlation. Generally, the Pearson correlation 
with a significant value greater than 0.8 indicates a linear relationship between 
independent variables (Gujarati, 2003). 
 
According to Hair et al. (2010) Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), an issue of 
multicollinearity arises if the independent variables correlation goes over 0.9. Along 
with the correlation test, the variance inflation factor (VIF) was conducted because the 
examination of the matrix correlations between variables does not always detect 
multicollinearity (Hamilton, 2009). VIF indicates the impact that other independent 
variables have on the standard error of regression coefficients. Collinearity problems 





The results in Table 4.2 indicate that multicollinearity does not exists between 
independent variables because the Pearson correlation indicators for all independent 
variables are less than 0.8. Moreover, to confirm the results and check whether there is 
multicollinearity between variables, Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and tolerance 
statistic are utilized. Hair et al. (2010) suggested that VIF of less than 10 and a tolerance 
statistic below 1 would indicate the existence of no serious multicollinearity problem. 
Table 4.2 shows that VIF ranges below 10 and tolerance value is less than 1. These 
results reinforce that there is no multicollinearity. 
Table 4.2  
VIF and Tolerance Statistic for Multicollinearity Assumption 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
RMCS 1.99 0.5036 
RMCI 1.85 0.5402 
Leverage 1.35 0.7385 
BFE 1.35 0.7428 
BankAge 1.21 0.8274 
FirmSize 1.12 0.8947 
 
 
4.4 Correlation Analysis 
 
In line with Pallant (2011), this study performed correlation analysis. Pallant (2011) 
suggested that it is useful to use the correlation analysis to determine the direction and 
strength of the variable’s linear relationship. The correlation analysis is the beginning 
step in the statistical techniques that determines if a mutual relationship between two or 
more variables exists. For this reason, the correlation analysis to examine the level and 
direction of mutual association of variables involved in the analysis needs to be 




correlation analysis was used to assess and clarify the strengths of the relationship 
between study variables, as shown in Table 4.3.  
 
The correlation coefficient values in Table 4.3 indicate the strength of the relationship 
between variables in determining this resistance or strength. Hair, Black, Babin, and 
Anderson (2010) recommended that the correlation value of 0 to show no relationship, 
while the correlation ± 1.0 shows an ideal positive relationship. On the other hand, 
Cohen (1988), found that the correlation of performance between 0 and 1.0 is as follows: 
a strong relationship is shown as above ± 0.50, middle relationship is shown in the 
values between ± 0.30 and ± 0.49, while the correlation of ± 0.1 and ± 0.29 shows a 
small relationship.  
 
Overall, the results of this study show that most of the correlations are less than 0.80. 
This corresponds to the Gujarati and Porter (2009) that the matrix of the correlation 
must not exceed 0.80 to safeguard that the multiple linear issue is not present in this 
study Table 4.3 showed the Pearson correlations for this study. From this correlation 
analysis, we can know the relationship between variable to another. The measurement 
of the value of Pearson correlation show the strength as well as the direction of the 
association between two variables. For this study, the relationships are determined 
between bank performance indicators (ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q) with three 
independent variables which are risk management committee size, risk management 
committee independence, and board financial expertise, and control variables which are 




Table 4.3 shows that the correlations between the ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q as the 
dependent variable and the independent variables. From the output, the independent 
variable risk management committee size is positively correlated with ROA, while the 
other two of independent variables which are risk management committee independence 
and board financial expertise are negatively correlated. While the control variable bank 
age and leverage are negatively correlated with ROA, bank size is positively correlated 
with ROA. 
 
According to the second dependent variable, it shows the correlations between the ROE 
as the dependent variable and the independent variables. From the results of the 
correlation tables, it can be concluded that the independent variable risk management 
committee size is positively correlated with ROE, while the other two of independent 
variables which are risk management committee independence and board financial 
expertise are negatively correlated. The control variables namely bank age and bank 
size are positively correlated with ROA and leverage is negatively correlated with ROA. 
 
Column 3 of Table 4.3 shows the correlations between the Tobin-Q as the dependent 
variable and the independent variables. From the results, three of independent variables 
which are risk management committee size, risk management committee independence, 
board financial expertise is negatively correlated with (Tobin-Q).  On contrary, bank 






Pearson Correlations  
 
 ROA ROE Tobin’s Q RMCS RMCI BFE BankAge Firmsize Leverage 
ROA 1.0000         
ROE 0.6882*** 1.0000        
 0.0000         
Tobin’s Q 0.4108** 0.3426** 1.0000       
 0.0017 0.0098        
RMCS 0.2371 0.1754 -0.0741 1.0000      
 0.0784 0.1961 0.5875       
RMCI -0.146 -0.1943 -0.10005 -0.6303*** 1.0000     
 0.2828 0.1514 0.4611 0.0000      
BFE -0.3507** -0.2249 -0.1613 -0.3062** 0.1122 1.0000    
 0.0081 0.0957 0.2349 0.0217 0.4102     
BankAge -0.2074 0.1191 0.0854 0.1095 0.0034 -0.1496 1.0000   
 0.1252 0.3820 0.5314 0.4218 0.9800** 0.2712    
FirmSize 0.2071 0.2535 0.2827** -0.1609 -0.0062 0.1158 0.1981 1.0000  
 0.1257 0.0594 0.0348 0.2362 0.9639 0.3954 0.1434   
Leverage -0.0168 -0.2582 -0.2345 0.0885 0.1344 -0.3729** -0.2056 -0.1453 1.0000 
 0.9021 0.0547 0.0820 0.5166 0.3235 0.0047 0.1284 0.2854  




4.5 Multiple Regressions Analysis  
 
Multiple regression analysis is a technique that is employed to determine the 
relationships between one or more independent variables and one dependent variable 
statistically. Two assumptions of multiple regressions tests, namely normality test and 
multicollinearity tests are discussed in the next section that follows.  
 
4.5.1 Assumption of Multiple Regression  
 
Prior to multiple regression analysis, it is important to examine the basic assumptions 
underlying the classical linear regression model. Therefore, in order to test the normality 
and linearity assumptions of the regression model, normality and multicollinearity tests 
are conducted. 
 
4.5.1.1 Normality Test  
 
Two analyses namely Skewness and Kurtosis are performed to test the normality of data 
distribution. The former analysis displayed normality of data with output values 
between ±3 (Coakes & Steed, 2003) while the kurtosis analysis also displayed normality 
with the output values of between ±3 (Kline, 1998).  
 
Table 4.4 displays the outcome of the two analyses. The analysis implies that all the 
value of skewness falls between the ranges of ±3. Therefore, ROE, ROA, Tobin’s Q, 
risk management committee size, risk management committee independence, board 




shown by kurtosis statistical value of more than +3 and -3. According to Hair (2010), 
this value is accepted and thus the data of this study takes into consideration the kurtosis 
and skewness analysis is normal.  
 
Normality means the distribution of the error (or residuals) is normally distributed. In 
multiple regressions, normality is not necessary to estimate the regression coefficients, 
but is useful for valid hypothesis testing (Chen, Ender, Mitchell and Wells, 2005). If the 
variable is within the acceptable range of skewness and kurtosis, then the variable can 
be said to fulfill the normality assumption. Based on table 4.4, it can be said that the 
residuals are somewhat normally distributed for the model. 
 
Table 4.4  
skewness and kurtosis 
Variable Obs Skewness Kurtosis 
ROA 56 -0.0013 1.8194 
ROE 56 0.0384 1.4983 
Tobin’s Q 56 -0.0151 2.3402 
RMCS 56 -0.1030 2.7418 
RMCI 56 0.3188 2.0969 
BFE 56 -0.0147 2.2629 
BankAge 56 0.0301 2.9544 
FirmSize 56 -2.0108 0.1218 











Homoscedasticity are assumption that shows the dependent variable as an equal level 
of variance across the range of independent variables. It is desirable because the 
variance of the dependent variable should not be concentrated in a limited range of the 
independent values. The presence of an unequal variance is said to be heteroscedasticity. 
Heteroskedasticity tends to make the coefficient estimate to be underestimated and 
sometimes making insignificant variables appear to be statistically significant (Hair et 
al., 2006). 
 
White General Heteroskedasticity Test and Cameron & Trivedi's tests are used to check 
the heteroscedasticity problem. The null hypothesis that the variance of the residual is 
homogenous is tested. Thus, a P value of less than 0.05 means we do not reject the 
hypothesis. The heteroskedasticity, skeweness, and kurtosis are shown in table 4.5,4.6, 













Table 4.5  
Heteroskedasticity Test (IM Test) Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test Source (Model 
I) 
Source   Chi2 df p 
Heteroskedasticity 41.76 27.00 0.03 
 Skewness 10.44 6.00 0.11 
Kurtosis 1.39 1.00 0.24 
Total 53.58 34.00 0.02 
Table 4.6  
Heteroskedasticity Test (IM Test) Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test Source (Model 
II) 
Source chi2 df p 
Heteroskedasticity 43.94 27.00 0.02 
Skewness 19.35 6.00 0.00 
Kurtosis 4.09 1.00 0.04 
Total 67.38 34.00 0.00 
Table 4.7  
Heteroskedasticity Test (IM Test) Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test Source (Model 
III) 
Source chi2 df p 
Heteroskedasticity 31.95 27.00 0.23 
Skewness 8.21 6.00 0.22 
Kurtosis 2.21 1.00 0.14 
Total 42.36 34.00 0.15 
 
By homoscedasticity, it refers to the homogeneity of the modification of the residuals 
across stages of the forecast values. Hair et al. (2010) stated that it is the equivalent 
variance of dependent variable across the range of predictor variables. Therefore, 
heteroskedasticity is created if the variance of the residuals is not constant. The presence 
of heteroskedasticity can cause a biased value for the true variance; the estimators of 
multiple regression analysis and inferences had been being very misleading and the t 
and F tests are likely to give inaccurate results (Gujarati, 2003). In order to address the 






ROA = α0 + β1 rmcsize it + β2 rmcindr it + β3 Bfknexp it + β4 lnta it + β5 agecorp it + β6 
tdta it + ε it 
ROE = α0 + β1 rmcsize it + β2 rmcindr it + β3 Bfknexp it + β4 lnta it + β5 agecorp it + 
β6 tdta it + ε it 
TobinsQ = α0 + β1 rmcsize it + β2 rmcindr it + β3 Bfknexp it + β4 lnta it + β5 agecorp it 
+ β6 tdta it + ε it 
 
4.7. The Evaluation of the Models 
4.7.1. Fixed effect Versus Random effect (Estimation Techniques and Diagnostic        
Tests) 
 
The study applied panel data estimation method as it has several advantages over time-
series data and cross-section sets. The method has a more statistical degree of freedom 
and smaller amount multicollinearity which will give more and efficient estimates, 
(Hsiao, 2003) and at the same time gives greater flexibility in displaying differences in 
behavior throughout the firms under study which will enable researcher to regulate for 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
The panel data analysis technique has two methods, which includes fixed effects model 
(FEM) which accepts omitted effects exact to cross sectional parts are constant over 
time and the random effects model (REM) which assumes the omitted effects are 
random over time. In order to select between the fixed effects and random effects, a 
Hausman test will be conducted. It is used to tests whether the exceptional errors are 
interrelated with the regresses; the null hypothesis is that they are not (Greene, 2008). 




of thumbs is if the Hausman test result is significant in the model, then fixed effect is 
preferable over random effect Al-Ajmi (2008). 
 
It is also necessary to determine whether the fixed effect or random effect approach is 
appropriate. A common practice in research is to make the choice between both 
approaches by running a Hausman test. The results of the three regression models that 
have been estimated to examine the impact of risk management committee size, risk 
management committee independence, board financial expertise on the financial 
performance (ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q) of commercial banks in Nigeria are shown 
below in table 4.8. 
 
As it is summarized in the table below, the R2 for the three models are 39.51 percent, 
40.80 percent, and 32.74 percent for the ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q respectively.  This 
means 39.51 percent of the variation in return on asset was explained by the independent 
and control variables used in this study, and 60.49 percent of variation in return on asset 
is due to other factor that are not included in this study.  Similarly, 40.80 percent of 
variation in return on equity was explained by the variables used in this study where the 
remaining 59.20 percent was explained by other factors not included in this study. The 
R2 of the third model implies that 32.74 percent of variation in Tobin’s Q was explained 
by the study variables and the remaining 67.26 percent was explained by other factors. 
The R2 results indicate the overall goodness-of-fit of the three models used in this study. 




between random or fixed effect, it is depicting that fixed effects should be used in model 
I, in model II and III the results advice to use random effect. 
 
Table 4.8  
Summary of regression results of the three models Variables 








































































































Observations 56  56  56  
R2 0.3951  0.4080  0.3274  
Adjusted-R2 0.3211  0.2685  0.0002  
Chi2 12.92  6.89  6.89  
Prob> Chi2 0.0241  0.3310  0.3310  
Effect 
specifictn 
Fixed Effect Random Effect Random Effect 
Note: *=Significant level at 10%, **=Significant level at 5%, *= Significant level at 1% 
 
In addition, the F-statistic shows the overall significance of variables in other words the 
significance of each models slopes parameters jointly. The R2 of the three models are 
39.51 percent, 40.80 percent, and 32.74 percent respectively. Therefore, each model 
variables are jointly significant. The three models adequately describe the data. Here 
one can infer from the results of R-squares that the implemented models of this research 






4.7.2. The Evaluation of Individual Models 
 
After testing of the regression assumptions, regression analyses are conducted using 
Stata version 14 to determine the effects of risk management committee size, risk 
management committee independence, board financial expertise of financial 
performance of Nigerian banks with control variables as bank age, and bank size, and 
leverage. The purpose of conducting multivariate regression test analysis is to regulate 
the predictive capability of the dependent variable by each of the independent variable. 
The current section is separated into three parts. Each part investigates the relationship 
between risk management committee size, risk management committee independence, 
board financial expertise with alternative measures of bank performance namely ROA, 
ROE and Tobin’s Q separately. However, there is significant relationship between board 
financial expertise and ROA. This revealed that educational background of boards 
influences negatively to the firm performance. In other words, the more financial expert 
in an organization the less would be the bank performance. This is because of the risk 
that will be avoided (Armano & Scagnelli,2012). On the other hand, there is a significant 
relationship between control variables of bank age, firm size and leverage with ROA. 
This indicates that the more firm incorporated and firm size the high ROA, while 
leverage leads to significantly increased revenues, increased debt may increase ROA.  
 
4.7.2.1 Model I (ROA as Dependent Variable) 
 
In examining the hypotheses model through a multivariate regression analysis, some 
indicators are employed. Among them are R2 (R Square) Coefficient, that evaluates the 




illustrate the independent variables that affect the variance of the dependent variable 
level. In the present study, the researcher makes use of R2 to show the variance amount 
of the dependent variable (ROA) that is described by all the dependent resulting from 
the joint effect of independent variable namely (risk management committee size, risk 
management committee independence, board financial expertise). As shown in the 
results of Table 4.9, this model shows that the value of R2 is 0.3951. This means that 
the model elucidates 39.51 % of the variance in its measurement. This is considered an 
acceptable result. The STATA (version 14) provides adjusted R2 value in the output. In 
cases where there is a small sample, R2 value is a slightly optimistic overestimation of 
the definite population value. (Tabachnic and Fidell, 2007). R2 indicates 0.3951 percent 
of variance in the dependent variable and explained the Changes in the independent 
variables. This means that the variations in bank performance was statistically explained 
or interpreted by the regression equation. The results in Table 4.9 also show that this 
model is significant which indicates the validity of the model used. 
 
Table 4.9  
The Coefficients of Multiple Regression Analysis (ROA) 
ROA Coef.   Std. Err. t P>t     [95% 95% Conf Interval 
RMCS 0.660 0.329 2.010 0.050 -.001 1.321 
RMCI 0.233 0.237 0.980 0.331 -.243 0.709 
BFE -1.342 0.356 -3.770 0.000 -2.685 -0.627 
BankAge -0.470 0.129 -3.640 0.001 -0.940 -0.211 
FirmSize 3.370 1.095 3.080 0.003 1.170 5.569 
Leverage -0.539 0.245 -2.200 0.032 1.031 -1.078 
_cons -1.812 1.201 -1.510 0.138 -4.226 0.602 
Number of Observation  56      
P > F  
0.0241 




   
  
Adjusted R-squared  
0.3211 









4.7.2.2 Model II (ROE as Dependent Variable) 
 
While Table 4.9 illustrates the multiple regression analysis of ROA, Table 4.10 below 
demonstrates the output of multiple regression analysis in relation to ROE as the 
dependent variable. The outcomes are measured by R2 in which the effect between the 
independent variables on the dependent variables are highlighted. It is apparent that 
40.80% of the ROE variance as displayed in Table 4.8 is determined by the independent 
variables. According to the R2 of 40.80%, it is thus concluded that beyond 40.80% of 
the relationship with ROE are determined by the three independent variables while the 
remaining 59.2 % of the impact to ROE is determined by other factors.  
 
Based on the ROE equation in Table 4.10, it is discovered that there is negative 
insignificance relationship between RMCS, RMCI, and ROE. However, there is a 
negative significance relationship between BFE and ROE, this explained that a decrease 
in BFE will lead to increase in ROE by 0.018. Likewise, with the control variables, if 
firm size increases by one, then performance of ROE too decreases by about 0.130 while 
there is negatively insignificant relationship exist between bank age and ROE. However, 









Table 4.10  
The Coefficients of Multiple Regression Analysis (ROE) 
 Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
RMCS 0.816 0.865 0.940 0.346 -.8796               2.5107 
RMCI 0.087 0.569 0.150 0.879 -1.028985           1.2028 
BFE -2.077 0.876 -2.370 0.018 -4.1550 -0.3604 
BankAge -0.156 0.403 -0.390 0.698 0-.9456           0.6330 
FirmSize 5.270 3.481 1.510 0.130 -1.5515           12.0918 
Leverage -1.468 0.567 -2.590 0.010 -2.9369 -0.3580 
_cons -2.152 3.564 -0.600 0.546 -9.1370             4.8340 
      
      
      
      
 
 
4.7.2.3 Model III (Tobin’s Q as Dependent Variable) 
 
Table 4.11 below demonstrates the output of multiple regression analysis in relation to 
Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. The outcomes are measured by R2 in which the 
effect between the independent variables on the dependent variables are highlighted. It 
is apparent that 32.74% of the Tobin’s Q variance as displayed in Table 4.8 is 
determined by the independent variables. According to the R2 of 32.74%, it is thus 
concluded that beyond 32.74% of the relationship with Tobin’s Q are determined by the 
three independent variables while the remaining 67.26% of the impact to Tobin’s Q is 
determined by other factors.  
 
Based on the Tobin’s Q equation in Table 4.11, it is discovered that there is negative 
and insignificance relationship between BFE, and Tobin’s Q. However, there is a 
negative insignificance relationship between RMCS, RMCI and Tobin’s Q. Likewise 




and Tobin’s Q and insignificant relationship was found between bank age, bank size 
and Tobin’s Q. 
 
Table 4.11 
The Coefficients of Multiple Regression Analysis (Tobin’s Q) 
 
Tobin’s Q Coef Std err T P>t [95% Conf Interval] 
RMCS -0.010 0.036 -0.270 0.791 -0.080 0.061 
RMCI 0.003 0.020 0.130 0.897 -0.037 0.043 
BFE 0.021 0.034 0.640 0.524 -0.044 0.087 
BankAge -0.017 0.037 -0.470 0.637 -0.090 0.055 
FirmSize -0.013 0.312 -0.040 0.966 -0.624 0.598 
Leverage -0.077 0.020 -3.760 0.000 -0.116 -0.153 
_cons 0.679 0.290 2.340 0.019 0.110 1.248 
 
4.8 Fitness of the Theories 
 
Recall that three models that measured bank performance were developed in chapter four. 
The models are the ROA, ROE and Tobin’s besides that, this study considered two theories, 
which were resource dependency theory and agency theory to explain the relationship 
between CG variables and firm performance variables measured as ROE, ROA and Tobin’s 
Q. Furthermore, the reason using agency theory is because it centers on information 
asymmetry reduction while Resource dependency theory focus on the connection of the 
board with external environment through which it can be equipped with the required levels 
of personal who possess high expertise and higher degree to assist a firm in dealing with 
both internal and external environments. This, in turn, it helps a firm to achieve its 
objectives of improved performance. 
Based on the results in Table 4.8, a summary of tested hypothesis and theories are 





Summary of tested hypothesis and theories 
N
O 
Hypothesis Theory Findings 
H1 There is a positive relationship between RMC Size and 





H2 There is a positive relationship between RMC 







H3 There is a positive relationship between board financial 







4.9. Summary of the Chapter 
 
In this chapter, it provided the outcomes of analyzing the data, the variables descriptive 
analyses and Pearson correlation analysis. This was followed by a discussion on the 
testing of assumptions which are namely, normality, multicollinearity, and the 
regression analysis and their discussion. The following chapter presents the discussion, 













CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains a discussion of hypothesis and summary of the study. Following, 
limitations and implication of the study and finally several suggestions are highlighted 
as guideline for future research. 
 
5.2 Summary of the Study and Discussion of Hypotheses 
 
The study investigates 14 listed banks that are quoted in the Nigeria Stock Exchange 
during the time frame of 2013 to 2016. This study aims at investigating the effect of risk 
management committee size, risk management committee independence, and board 
financial expertise on the financial performance of quoted banks in Nigerian. Financial 
performance of Nigerian banks is proxied by ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q. Based on the 
results and findings that are obtainable in Table 4.8, the following sections provide a 
summary of the discussions on the findings generated by the three models considering 
(ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q). 
 
5.2.1 Discussion of First Model (Results Based on ROA) 
 
In this section, this current study provided the hypothesis testing on the risk management 
committee size, risk management committee independence, and board financial 




age, firm size and leverage with firm performance. As consistent with the results in 
Table 4.8, some of the variables were found to be associated with ROA. 
With the line of expectations from the previous studies, the relationship between risk 
management committee size and return on assets was insignificant, indicating that H1 is 
rejected. The result shows that risk management committee size does contribute to 
improvement in the performance of the company measured by ROA. 
 
While previous studies suggested that there is a positive relationship between the ROA 
and the risk management committee size, this study, as depicted in Table 4.8 shows an 
insignificant relationship between the risk management committee size and ROA. This 
finding is similar with some previous studies such as Adams and Mehran, (2005) Sahu 
and Manna (2013), Guoa and Kgab (2012), and Ibrahim and Abdul Samad (2011). 
 
The insignificant relationship between risk management committee size, and ROA can 
be explained possibly due to the major actions adopted by the board. The insignificant 
relationship among the share of the outside director and company performance would 
support signaling theory. Poor company performance forces management or controlling 
shareholders to appoint outside directors to improve performance with the professional 
competencies that the outside directors are having to give a positive signal to the 
investors for the improved performance in the future.  
 
There is an insignificant positive relationship exists between risk management 




exists between the risk management committee independence and ROA. However, the 
finding as apparent in Table 4.8 revealed that risk management committee independence 
has an insignificantly relationship to ROA. The result of the insignificant relationship 
between risk management committee independence and ROA is consistent prior studies 
that found that board independence has not association to ROA such as Kyereboah-
Coleman (2007). 
 
However, there is a significant negative relationship exists between board financial 
expertise and ROA, this study hypothesized that a positive relationship exists between 
the board financial expertise and ROA. However, the finding as presented in Table 4.8 
revealed that board financial expertise has significantly negative relationship with ROA. 
This shows that that educational backgrounds influence negatively to firm profitability. 
There may be other factors apart from educational background such as experiences, 
training, and managerial skills that lead to better firm profitability. The significant 
relationship between board financial expertise and ROA revealed that the more the 
financial expert in an organization the less would be the bank performance proxied by 
ROA. This is because of the risk that will be avoided. This finding is consistent prior 
studies that found that board financial expertise has association to ROA such as Güner, 
A. B., Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2006), Darmadi, S. (2013), Armano & Scagnelli 
(2012). The significant relationship also is found in all control variables; firm size, firm 






5.2.2 Discussion of Second Model (Results Based on ROE) 
 
With the line of expectations from the previous studies, the relationship between risk 
management committee size and return on equity was positively insignificant, 
indicating that H2 is rejected s. The result shows that risk management committee size 
does contribute to improving the performance of the company via ROE. 
 
While previous studies suggested that there is a positive relationship between the ROE 
and the risk management committee size, this study, as depicted in Table 4.8 shows an 
insignificant and positive relationship between the risk management committee size and 
ROE. This finding is similar with some previous studies such as Adams and Mehran, 
(2005) Sahu and Manna (2013), Guoa and Kgab (2012), and Ibrahim and Abdul Samad 
(2011). 
 
The insignificant relationship between risk management committee size, and ROE can 
be explained possibly due to the major actions adopted by the board. The insignificant 
relationship among the share of the outside director and company performance would 
support signaling theory. Poor company performance forces management or controlling 
shareholders to appoint outside directors to improve performance with the professional 
competencies that the outside directors are having to give a positive signal to the 
investors for the improved performance in the future. 
 
There is an insignificant positive relationship exists between risk management 




exists between the risk management committee independence and ROE. However, the 
finding as apparent in Table 4.8 revealed that risk management committee independence 
has an insignificantly relationship to ROE. The result of the insignificant relationship 
between risk management committee independence and ROE is like prior studies that 
found that board independence has not association to ROE such as Kyereboah-Coleman 
(2007). 
 
Furthermore, there is an insignificant negative relationship exists between board 
financial expertise and ROE, this study hypothesized that a positive relationship exists 
between the board financial expertise and ROE. However, the finding as presented in 
the previous chapter revealed that board financial expertise has a negative and 
insignificantly relationship with ROE. The insignificant relationship between board 
financial expertise and ROE revealed that the more the financial expert in an 
organization the less the performance proxies by ROE. This is because of the risk that 
will be avoided. In other words, the reason for negative relation between board financial 
expertise and risk aversion may be “overcautiousness”. This finding is similar to prior 
studies that found that board financial expertise has not association to ROE such as 
Güner, Malmendier & Tate (2006). The insignificant relationship also is found in all the 








5.2.3 Discussion of Third Model (Results Based on Tobin’s Q) 
 
With the line of expectations from the previous studies, this study hypothesized that risk 
management committee size, risk management committee independence, and board 
financial expertise is expected to enhance the Tobin’s Q. The statistical results of the 
current study show that the relationship between risk management committee size, risk 
management committee independence and Tobin’s Q is insignificant. However, 
insignificant relationship was found between financial expert and Tobin’s Q. Also, a 
negative and significance relationship exist between leverage and performance proxies 
by Tobin’s Q, in the Nigerian banks. This result is in line with previous empirical studies 
such us Noor (2011), Kim and Yoon (2007), Ghabayen (2012) and Abdurrouf (2011) in 
developing countries and Wei (2007) in China. 
 
This result matches the insignificant result on board size indicating that the role of some 
specific board practices aspects in developed countries of firm performance measured 
by market-based proxies is absent in the case of Nigeria. Likewise, insignificant results 
of the board size in Nigeria indicates corporate governance mechanism in Nigeria is still 
developing. Moreover, external corporate governance mechanisms are weak, the banks 
consider the board independence more significant factor as compared to board size or 
financial experts.  
 
The reason for insignificant result is that only existence of board independence and 
financial experts on the performance may not be enough for the achievement of the 




5.3 Implication of the Study  
 
The research investigates the effect of risk management committee size, risk 
management committee independence, and board financial expertise on the financial 
performance of quoted banks in Nigerian. The findings of the study would give 
invaluable insight to the stock market, government, auditing and accounting regulators 
and auditing and accounting professional bodies, as to what extent codes of corporate 
governance degrees, regulators, resolutions, and laws are implemented by the banks and 
other financial services. Furthermore, the study provides insights to the government and 
regulators when making new policies or deliberating on issues regarding corporate 
governance in relation to bank performance. Finally, the findings of this thesis supported 
by the theories and have made an important contribution in accounting and finance 
literature, by providing empirical evidence on how risk management committee size, 
risk management committee independence, and board financial expertise are related to 




Limitations of this study are discussed and recommendations on the directions for future 
research are subsequently discussed.   
 
The results of this study provide numerous insights that may be of interests to scholars, 
government, shareholders, policy-markets, institutions investigations and other also 





Primarily, this study is concentrated only on Nigerian listed bank. Consequently, the 
validation of the conclusion might not be applicable for other banks that are not listed 
on the stock market. In addition, this study uses only ROA, ROE as proxies for 
accounting performance, while Tobin’s Q as proxy for market-based performance and 
thus other measurements are disregarded. This study does not take into consideration 
other methods of performance measurements such as return on investment.  
 
Next, the limitation that this study does not include several other aspects such as CG 
features of ownership structure (managerial ownership, ownership concentration, 
government ownership and institutional ownership), CEO duality, CEO tenure, board, 
auditor quality and audit committee process is also considered. The limitation of the 
study is also due to the nature of the collected data in the form of annual report which 
may not be disclosed in other countries.  
 
5.5 Suggestions for Future Research  
 
Future researches can explore unlisted banks and other financial firms by employing 
various methods such as Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). Future studies can 
also consider extending the duration of their studies or to conduct longitudinal studies 
to learn both the short- and long-term effects.  
 
Furthermore, further research can also focus on including completely different aspects 




nominating committees, the regularity of meeting among board directors and the 
director’s skills and capabilities. It is recommended for future studies to consider other 
variables such as the number and percentage of external board members, ownership 
concentration, insider ownership, and the presence of audit committee, voting 
coalitions, product-market competition and other cultural factors. 
 
Besides that, it is also suggested that future researches are conducted in different world 
countries as countries differ in business environment, education cultures, etc. The 
quality of performances can also be investigated through non-financial such as 
workforce development, product quality, customer satisfaction, on time delivery to 
determine if performance really does improve over time. Moreover, future researches 
should include the other financial measurement of performance such as liquidity and 
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